Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

6-11-1954

Chastain v. Belmont
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Chastain v. Belmont" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 216.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/216

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

u

1fi34l

BELM.ON'l'

45

P2d 498]

A.

~o.

W. CHA:ST

!23007.

Jn Bunk.

.June ll,

Plaintiff anu
v. FRANK
Defendant and Appellant.

BEI.~110?\'T,

Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Fraud and Mistake.-~ Although
contract has been reduced to
the
parol
evidenee is admissible to show
aceid<mt or mistake.
!d.-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Interpretation.--Parol eviof an ambiguous
deuce is admissible to aid in
eontract or writing.
!d.-Extrinsic Evidence-Fraud: Reformation of Instruments
-Instruments Reformable.-Praud in execution or inducement
of a written contract may be shown, and revision of a written
eontract may be sought, where mistake or imperfection of thP
writing is put in issue by pleadings.
L4] Sales- Actions- Extrinsic Evidence.~- Where provisions in
written contract for sale of plaintiff's orange crop to defendant are ambiguous with reference to use of term "merchantable
fruit" and it is uncertain whether defendant had guaranteed
a certain price for every field box or only for every field box
of merchantable fruit with defendant as sole judge of merchantability, and where there is an inconsistency between provision to pay a certain price per box and that which provides
that plaintiff was to receive total amount received from sale
of fruit after certain deductions had been made, parol evidence
is admissible to clarify such ambiguities.
[5] Id.--Actions-Evidence-Fraud.--In action for damages for
conversion of orange crop sold by plaintiff to defendant, find·
ings that defendant induced plaintiff to execute written contract in reliance on representations that he would guarantee
a certain price per box, that defendant's agent represented
that contract expressed oral agreement of the parties, that
these rPpresentations wPre false and made with intent to deeei ve plaintiff, and that plaintiff did not learn that contract
did not conform to oral agreement until he received a statement from defendant six months later, are ~ustained by plaintill's tPstimony to that eirect.
Right to show fraud in indueement or execution of written
note, 56 A.L.R. 13. See also Cal.Jur., Evidence, §§ 202,
203; Am.Jur., Praud and Deceit, § 267; Am.Jur., Mistake.
McK. Dig. References: [1] EvidPnce, §§ 388, 380; [2] Evidence,
396; [3] Evidence, § 388; Reformation of Instruments, § 11;
Sales,§ 212; [5] Sales,§ 238; [6] Sales,§ 5; [7] Sales, § 247;
§ 36(1); [9] AgPncy, § 115; [10] Damages,§ ]72.
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!d.-Transactions Constituting.--A written agreement between
an orange grower and a fruit shipper in which "Shipper guarantees to Grower $1.00 per field box for 3519 cu. inch box
for all citrus fruit received and accepted as per contraet for
and during current season only" is a contract of purchase and
sale rather than a consignment, where grower testified that
agent told him he would
$1.00 per box net with
that if his fruit brought more than $.LOO
per box
for
he ·would receive that
amount in addition to the $1.00
[7] Id.-Actions-Findings.·-In action for
for conversion of orange crop sold
plaintiff to defendant, in which
plaintiff alleged, as affirmative defenses to def(;ndant's crosscomplaint for money loaned and for liquidated damages, false
representations on part of defendant's agent together with
fact that eontract was represented to plaintiff as containing
agreement which had been orally agreed on, and also that an
exhibit attached to cross-complaint was a true eopy of written
agreement signed by plaintiff except that such instrument
covered one year's crop only, there is no inconsistency in
finding all of these defenses were true, since plaintiff could
do nothing other than admit that contract was the one he had
signed and since he did not thereby admit that contract signed
by him conformed to oral agreement of the parties.
[8] Id.-Contract-Interpretation.-Where contract for sale of
orange crop clearly states that buyer's guarantee of a certain
price per box is to extend to current crop only, such guarantee
cannot cover boxes picked by buyer in the following year.
[9] Agency-Ratification-Knowledge of PrincipaL-A principal
must have knowledge of material facts at time of alleged ratification to be held liable for unauthorized act of another.
[10] Damages-Burden of Proof-Liquidated Damages.-The person relying on a liquidated damage provision has burden of
pleading and proving that, when contract was entered into.
the fixing of damages was impracticable or extremely difficult.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Orange County. Kenneth E. Morrison, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
Action for damages for conversion of orange crop, in which
defendant filed a cross-complaint for money on a book aceount and for unliquidated damages. Judgment for defendant reversed with directions.
See Cal.Jur.2d, Agency, § 84 et seq.; Am.Jur., Agency, § 224.
[10) See Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 201 et seq.; Am.Jur., Damages,
§ 240 et seq.
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Harvey, Himel & Johnston and Fred D. Johnston for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
G. V. Weikert and S. B. Kaufman for Defendant and Appellant.
CARTEH, J.-Plaintiff, A. \V. Chastain, brought an action
for damages for conversion against defendant, Frank Belmont.
Defendant cross-complained for ":Money on a Book Account
and for I_~iquidated Damages.'' l<'indings of fact, conclusions
of law, and a judgment were entered, and both parties appealed.
The pleadings show that the parties entered into a certain
agreement entitled a ''Consignment Contract'' in August,
1949. The construction and interpretation of this contract
is, essentially, the only point involved in the case.
'l'he contract provided, in part, as follows:
''In consideration of the mutual covenants herein assumed,
the undersigned Grower rA. \V. Chastain] agrees to and
c1oes hereby consign to FnANK BEI,J.\WNT, doing business as
GHANADA PACKING HousE hereinafter referred to as Shipper,
of Anaheim, California, all oranges now growing and to be
grown during the term of this contract of his citrus orchard
consisting of 15 acres. . . .
"'l'his contract covers the citrus fruit growing and to be
grown on said groYe on and after the date of this contraet
and until this eontract is terminated by the Grower in the
follmying manner: The Grower, if he is not indebted to the
Shipper, may terminate this contract by giving Shipper a
written notiee to that effect during the last ten days of November of any subsequent year and in such event this contract shall
be automatieally converted into a prorate contraet, covering
the fruit to be grown on said orchard during the following
season.
''This contract cot,ers merchantable fruit only and the
8hippe1~ m· his agent shall be the sole .iudge as to the merchantability of said fruit, and shall decide at the time of processing
what shall be accepted as merchantable fruit. Since frozen
fnlit goes into by-products, same 1·s not accepted as merchantable . . . .
''Shipper agrees to pay to the Grower the total amount
received from the sale of said fruit, after deducting therefrom
all sums of money (1) paid out or advanced hereunder, or
loaned or advanced to or for the use and benefit of the
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Grower, or (3) paid out for picking and processing said fruit,
also deducting . . . [enumerated charges]. Should the fruit
hereby consigned be not sufficient to repay said Shipper all
sums, amounts or charges above mentioned, Grower agrees
to pay any balance to Shipper within 10 days after notification
by Shipper of the amount due, and in the event of his failure
to pay same within 10 days after such notification the term
of this contract shall be extended to cover the following season
and shall thereafter be further extended to cover succeeding
seasons while Grower remains indebted to Shipper . . . .
"Grower agrees to pay the Shipper as liquidated damages,
the sum of thirty -five cents ( 35c) for each and every commercial package or box (known to the trade as 'standard field
box') or the equivalent thereof of citrus fruit, which the
Grower may dispose of, sell, market or consign to any person
other than the Shipper named herein or that Grower may
remove or permit to be removed from said citrus orchard or
fail to deliver to said Shipper, it being specifically agreed
that it is impracticable and extremely difficult to fix the actual
damage which would there be suffered by the Shipper.
"Shipper guarantees to Grower 1.00 per field box for 3519
cu. inch box* for all citrus fruit received and accepted as per
contract for and during current season only.
"This contract supercedes [sic] and supplants all preliminary or other prior arrangements or agreements, oral or
written, and no verbal representation or guarantee by either
party or the agent of either party to the execution of this
agreement or during its prrformance, shall br recognized by, or
binding upon, either party. 'l'he terms of tl1is contract cannot
be changed or altered by any provisions added hereto unless
such additional proV?·sions are personally approved in writing
by the Grower and Frank Belmont." (Emphasis added.)
This contract was signed by A. "\V. Chastain, as Grower,
and by Herb Miller on behalf of Granada Packing House. On
the back of the copy of the contract retained by Ohastm:n
were these words: ''This contract covers 194-9 crop only.
Herb Miller."
Chastain sued for damages for conversion alleging that
Belmont had picked 1,226 field boxes of Valencia oranges of
Chastain's 1950 crop. Belmont's cross-complaint alleged the
written contract; that Chastain was indebted to him in the
sum of $5,297.60-the balance due him by reason of a $6,000
*Written in pencil.
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advance made to Chastain at the time the contract was entered
into; and for liquidated damages under the contract at the
rate· of 35 cents per box for the balance of the 1950 crop of
Valencia oranges which Chastain had withheld from him and
disposed of elsewhere.
It is Chastain's position that the $1.00 field box guarantee
applies to all oranges picked by Belmont. Belmont, on the
other hand, contends that the guarantee applies only to merchantable fruit as to which he, as Shipper, was the sole judge.
Under Chastain's theory, he admittedly owed $1,034, which
was allegedly the balance due Belmont from the $6,000 advance
made after the various deductions had been taken care of.
'l'he trial court concluded (the findings of fact will be set
forth at length in the sueceeding pages) that the contract
was, in reality, one of purchase and sale; that it was in effect
and covered the 1950 crop; that Belmont owed Chastain
$1.00 per box for all oranges picked by him in 1949 and 1950;
that Chastain owed Belmont, as liquidated damages, the sum
of 35 cents for each of the 2,049 boxes which he had prevented
Belmont from picking and had disposed of elsewhere. Belmont
was awarded judgment on his eross-complaint against Chastain
in the sum of $620.79 together with eosts. Belmont appeals
from the judgment only in so far as it awarded him the sum
of $620.79 instead of $5,085.14 plus interest. Chastain appeals
from the judgment only in so far as it awarded Belmont
liquidated damages and eosts.
BELMONT's APPEAr,

Belmont eontends that under the consignment contract the
guarantee was limited to that portion of the 1949 crop of fruit
classified by him as merehantable and that eertain findings
of fact made by the trial court with reference to the contract
were confusing, conflicting, self-contradictory and unsupported
by the evidence.
Finding XX complained of found as true all the allegations of Chastain's first, second and third affirmative defenses
to Belmont's cross-complaint except the allegation that the
contract was one of consignment. As to the eontract, the
court found it to be one of purchase and sale.
In the first affirmative defense just referred to, Chastain
alleged that he had at first refused to sell his 1949 crop of
oranges when approached by defendant's agent because he
had been offered a guarantee of $1.00 per smaller field box
nt>t on the trt>PS and that hP had so advised dPfendant's agent.

executed tlle contract or
that he did not learn that the eoninJC:t did not eonform to
the oral
nntil he
a statemen from the
defendant in ,January, 1D50.
also al
thilt immediately upon
the nnmber of field boxes \Yhieh
had been
defendant, he offered to repay the defendant the differenc:e b0twe0n t lw number of fil:'ld boxeb
at the guaranteed
of .00 p0r· box ;md the sum of $G,OOO
advanced by defendant.
In Chastain's second affirmative
incorporating the
of
il1e first affirmative defense) that at 1he
tion of the agreement, defen{1ant and J1is
written agreement di{1 not conform to i he intention of
parties and that
knew that
written instrument did

As a" third
added) it is alleged
two of the first) that "'J<Jxhihit
to the cross-complaint, is a true copy of the written instrument signed by
that the instrument
signed by cross-defendant does not have the
and date
appearing immediately to the
of the
of 'A.
\V. Chastain,' and
crossdefendant contains the
,
''This instrument coyers 1949 crop
It is also
here that under
written eontraet as
Belmont
of $1.00 per 3519 eubie iuch field box

Belmont's
the oral

contract
therei
are: "This
awl the Shipper or his
the merehantability of
of
what
merchantable frulL Since frozeu fruit
not
a~; merchantable."
to Grower 1.00 per field box for
citrns fruit received and accepted

" Anof Uw colltraet
provides
agrees to pay to the Grower the total amount re-

from the sale of the fruit "after
therefrom
of mone~·
ont or alh·m1c:ed .. ete."
that llc had been led to believe, because of
made
defendant's agent, that these promeant that he 1vas to receive $1.00 per field box of
im:hes for aU fruit taken
defendant. [1] Alcontraet has been rrduced to writing by the parties,
admissible to show
aecident or mis2]!) CaL 43!), 442
P.2d 645].)
iF; also admissible to aid in the interpreeontract or
( Cali[ornia Emp.
559
P.2d 17]).
8tab. Com. v. Walters,
"[t]he very
that plaintiff questioned
ecrtain IYOrfh and clanE>es used in framing the
in itself shows that 1t \Yas
(BodyCo. v. Plohll
63 Cal.App.2d 555 [147 P.2d

l43 0.2d
. ) '' 'rhe first paragraph above quoted could be construed as contended for by defendant and still be ambiguous inasmuch as the only expression as to what did not
constitute merchantable fruit is the reference to frozen fruit.
'l'he second paragraph above quoted provides for a guarantee
of $1.00 per box of all fruit received and accepted as per
contract. Another provision of the contract provides that it
covers "the citrus fruit growing and to be grown on said
grove on and after the date of this contract. . . . '' Still another provision of the contract provided that plaintiff was
to receive the total amount received from the sale of the fruit
after certaiu deductions had been made.
[3] Fraud in the
execution or inducement of a written contract may be shown,
and revision of a written contract may be sought, where mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the
pleadings. (Alameda County Title Ins. Co. v. Panella, 218
Cal. 510, 513 [24 P.2d 163].) [4] Plaintiff alleged that
certain misrepresentations were made to him concerning the
meaning of the contract he signed; that such representations
were that the contract expressed the true intent of the parties.
It would appear from the quoted portions that the contract
was ambiguous on its face and that parol evidence was properly
admitted in clarification thereof. In Groover v. Belmont,
114 Cal.App.2d 623, 625, 626 [250 P.2d 686], the court ordered
the plaintiff to amend her answer to the cross-complaint in
order to conform to proof. She then alleged in greater detail
mistake, fraudulent representations and concealment on the
part of defendant. The facts in that case were substantially
similar to those involved here with the same question involved
-whether defendant Prank Belmont had guaranteed a certain price ( 35 cents) for every field box or only for every
field box of merchantable fruit with defendant the sole judge
of merchantability. Defendant argued there, as here, that
since there was no ambiguity, inconsistency or uncertainty in
the contract parol evidence was not admissible. The court
held ''The oral evidence was properly admitted here. The
written contract was ambiguous in many respects and there
was an obvious inconsistency between the provisions contained
in the fine print and the provision written in longhand. The
latter guaranteed 35 cents per field box to the grower for the
fruit taken, while the former provided that the packer should
pay the grower only what was left after deducting numerous
charges, and after eliminating any fruit which the packer
might prefer to consider as unmerchantable. Moreover, mis-
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misrepresentation and fraud were alleged and the
and nature of the agreement was the fact in dispute."
In the case of Groover v. Belmont, supra, as hereinbefore
noted, the court points out that there is an obvious inconsistency between the provision to pay a certain price per box
and that which provides that Belmont shall pay to the grower
(plaintiff here) only what was left after deducting numerous
eharges and eliminating any fruit which the packer might
to consider as unmerchantable.
It would appear from the foregoing that parol evidence
was properly admitted under the allegation of fraud, and to
elarify the patent ambiguity of the contract which was attached as an exhibit to the answer to the cross-complaint.
[5] In answer to defendant's contention that the finding
of the trial court concerning his alleged fraud was not supported by the evidence, it appears that Chastain's testimony,
which has been set forth heretofore, amply supports the finding.
'l'his testimony, if believed, as it apparently was, was sufficient
to support the finding. Miller, defendant's agent, testified
in a manner which was called "equivocal in a marked degree"
by the District Court of Appeal in referring to the testimony
of one Ogilvie, defendant's agent involved in the case of
Groover v. Belmont, supra.
[6] Belmont next contends that there was not one word of
testimony to support the trial court's finding that the contract
was one of purchase and sale rather than of eonsignment.
Chastain argues that the point is immaterial. Plaintiff, however, alleged in his answer to the cross-complaint (First
Affirmative Defense) that defendant, through his agent '' requested of eross-defendant that he sell to cross-complainant
his 1949 crop of oranges. . . . '' and that ''cross-complainant
paicl to cross-defendant the sum of $6,000.00 as payment for
rross-defendant's crop of fruit estimated to be six thousand
(6000) boxes . . . . " In Jackson v. Belmont, 108 Cal.App.2d
288 [238 P.2d 1084], substantially the same contract as the one
presently under consideration was involved. The court there
said, quoting from White v. Arclzrooni, 71 Cal.App. 393, 400
r235 P. 461]: "The writing itself provides for a minimum
guaranteed price. If deductions were to be made from the
guaranteed price, then that term in the written agreement
would become practically meaningless. We think the true
construction of the instrument and which carries out the intention of the parties to be that the defendants undertook to
guarantee certain returns to the growers for the grapes to be
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for
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the contract was in fnll
Chastain failed and
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awl cross-defendant the sum of $6,000.00. Plaintiff and
•·ross-defendant is entitled to a credit for 4,966 field boxes
of oranges picked in 1949 at $1.00 per field box under the
guarantee provisions of said contract, leaving a balance of
$1 ,o:34.00 owing at the end of the 1949 picking season. Defendant and cross-complainant is entitled to interest on said
last mentioned sum at the rate of 7% per annum, to June
28, 1950, in the sum of $47.65. Defendant and cross-complainant is also entitled to a credit of 35¢ per field box on the 2,049
field boxes of oranges of the 1950 crop which plaintiff and
cross-defendant withheld from defendant and cross-complainant, as liquidated damages under said contract, in the sum
of $717.15. F'rom this total of $1,798.80, plaintiff and crossdefendant is entitled to have deducted the sum of $1,226.00
for the 1,226 field boxes of oranges of the 1950 crop which
defendant and cross-complainant picked, under the guarantee
provisions of said contract leaving a balance of $572.80 owing,
plus $47.99 interest to October 16, 1951, making a total of
$620.70 [sic] due, owing and unpaid from plaintiff and crossdefendant to defendant and cross-complainant.''
Althongh Chastain prayed for reformation of the contract,
the trial court did not purport to reform it. In this regard,
it should be noted that plaintiff alleged that the proposed
written contract was to cover the 1949 crop only. The trial
court found this to be true, but at the same time found the
contr·act cover"ed the 19:10 crop. Finding No. XXI provides,
however, that all allegations inconsistent with the "foregoing
findings of fact are ... untrue.''
rrhe trial court found that a contract was entered into
between the parties on August 4, 1949, and that the copy
marked Exhibit ''A'' was a true copy except for certain
exceptions (not material for this particular discussion). The
trial court also found that the $1.00 guarantee extended to
eaeh and ('Very field box of not only the 1949 crop of oranges,
bnt that of 1950 although the contract specifically set forth
that the guarantee applied to the current (1949) season only.
In this respect, it should be noted that plaintiff objects to
the holding that the contract applied to the 1950 crop and
to the award to defendant of 35 cents per box as liquidated
damages for oranges picked by plaintiff during that season
but has no complaint concerning the award to himself of the
$1.00 guarant~>e per box for oranges picked by Belmont during
that time.
Belmont concluded his cross-complaint with a prayer for
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judgment in the sum of $5,297.60 plus 7 per cent interest per
annum until paid and for judgment in the sum of $1,750
as liquidated damages and for costs. On appeal, he contends
that to the balance of $4,367.99 "owed by Chastain to Belmont'' there should be added the liquidated damages awarded
to Belmont by the trial court in the sum of $717.15, "making
a total of $5.085.14. And to that total there should be added
interest on the sum of $4,367.99, at the rate of 7% per annum
from April 30, 1951, to the date of the judgment."
The essence of the holding of the trial court is that the
$1.00 per box covered every field box of fruit picked during
the J 949 and 1950 seasons. In view of the parol evidence
admitted to clarify the ambiguity in the contract, it would
appear that the finding as to the 1949 crop was sustained by
the evidence and that it was a proper interpretation of the
contract. In view of the clear wording of the contract that
the guarantee was to extend to the current crop only, we do
not see how the guarantee could be said to cover the 1,226
boxes picked by Belmont in 1950.
CHASTAIN'S APPEAL

Plaintiff Chastain's position is that the contract did not
cover the 1950 crop by reason of the limiting clause placed
there by defendant's agent. The record shows that Miller,
the agent, had not advised Belmont that he had so limited
the coverage of the contract. It should also be noted that the
record shows that the clause was placed there after Chastain
had signed the contract on his own behalf and after Miller
had signed it on behalf of Granada Packing House. The
limiting sentence is signed by Miller only and not on behalf
of the Granada Packing House or defendant Belmont. The
contract also contains a provision that any changes, or additions, must be personally approved in writing by both the
Grower and "Frank Belmont." It appears to us from the
findings of fact that the trial court found the contract covered
the 1950 fruit crop because this provision had not been
complied with.
Chastain contends that the $1.00 guarantee should apply
to every field box picked by Belmont during the 1949 season.
He says that "The court's conclusion with reference to the
continuing existence of the contract appears to be wrong."
He argues that Belmont is chargeable with his agent's act
in placing the 1949 limitation on the contract by reason of his
ratification of the contract ''as made.'' As we have heretofore
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per box
1950 crop of
as it holds
Belmont $1.00 per
Chastain's 1950
determine the sole issue
of the boxes of oranges picked
crop and offset the amount
heretofore determined to
and enter judgment acown costs on this appeal.
and Bray, J.
in the

Belmont for a

*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

was denied

